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 THE EFFECTS OF JURY IGNORANCE ABOUT DAMAGE 
CAPS: THE CASE OF THE 1991 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
 
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff† & Matthew T. Bodie‡  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The way that juries determine damages has always been a 
mystery worth investigating.1  Particularly intriguing are the 
deliberations that lead to million or even billion-dollar verdicts.2  The 
awe-inspiring breadth of these verdicts—even if they are short-lived—
has provoked an independent political movement to curb their excesses.3  
Yet simultaneous with this concern over the runaway jury is a 
fundamental desire to protect the integrity of the jury process and 
maintain respect for the jury’s function and decisions.  The concurrent 
desires to exalt and to rein in the jury come face-to-face in laws aimed at 
capping the damages that a jury can award in a civil case.  Damage cap 
statutes expressly limit the power of the jury to provide monetary relief 
to plaintiffs.4  At the same time, some statutes, case law, and 
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1 See Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us 
About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 
137 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
2 See, e.g., Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco, No. 94-08273 CA-22, 2000 WL 
33534572 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000) (jury verdict awarding $145 billion in punitive 
damages), rev’d sub nom. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So.2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
3 See Terry Carter, It’s B-a-a-a-ck: With Republicans in Charge, Will Tort Reform 
Finally Have Its Day?, 46 ABA JOURNAL E-REPORT 3, 3 (December 6, 2002) (“Most 
talked about [potential Congressional tort reforms] are legislative proposals concerning 
asbestos litigation, medical malpractice liability, class action venues and perhaps some 
limitations on punitive damages.”). 
4 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (2000).  For a discussion of the reforms enacted 
in 1986 by roughly sixty percent of states, see Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort 
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commentators suggest that informing the jury of the caps threatens the 
integrity of the jury decision-making process.5  The 1991 Civil Rights 
Act offers one such statutory example of an effort to protect defendants 
from more expensive jury awards while concurrently attempting to 
maintain the “integrity” of these awards. 
Prior to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs bringing federal 
employment discrimination claims were entitled only to the most basic 
relief: reinstatement and back wages, reduced by interim earnings that 
had or should have been earned.6  Judges awarded this equitable relief, 
rather than juries; plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial.7  The 1991 
Act changed all this, and in so doing has been recognized as a watershed 
moment in employment discrimination litigation.8  Now, either party 
may demand a trial by jury.9  And instead of simply seeking 
reinstatement and back pay, plaintiffs can demand compensatory 
damages for future pecuniary losses, as well as emotional pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, and other non-pecuniary losses.10  Additionally, if the 
defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference, the plaintiff may 
recover punitive damages.11  These new damages radically improved the 
potential relief available to federal employment discrimination plaintiffs, 
opening up the possibility for much larger judgments. 
These pro-plaintiff changes were mitigated somewhat by caps on 
punitive and compensatory damages.12  These caps are scaled according 
to the size of the defendant-employer and are unrelated to the severity of 
the offense.13  Such caps are not unique; a number of other statutes 
expressly limit the recovery of damages to a set or formulated 
                                                                                                                       
Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on 
Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628 (1988). 
5 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2); Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 1996); 
Michael S. Kang, Comment, Don't Tell Juries About Statutory Damage Caps: The 
Merits of Non-Disclosure, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 470 (1999). 
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000). 
7 Id. §2000e-5(f)(4). 
8 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 WIS. 
L. REV. 277, 279 (noting that “the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
attracted to the practice of employment law a new generation of lawyers, who approach 
employment litigation like personal injury cases”). 
9 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1) (2000). 
10 Id. § 1981a(b)(3). 
11 Id. § 1981a(b)(1). 
12 Id. § 1981a(b)(3). 
13 Combined compensatory and punitive damages cannot exceed $50,000 if the 
employer has 100 or fewer employees, $100,000 for employers with 100 to 200 
employees, $200,000 for employers with 200 to 500 employees, and $300,000 for 
employers with more than 500 employees.  See id.  These numbers do not, however, 
include any back pay that the jury awards. 
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maximum.14  Caps are part of an overall movement to reform the tort 
system, typically supported by those who believe that the civil legal 
system unfairly burdens society by levying massive damage awards.15   
In an interesting twist, the 1991 Act also expressly required that 
“the court shall not inform the jury of the limitations [on damages].”16 
Thus, when called upon to measure damages in federal employment 
discrimination cases, juries are expected to make their calculations 
without knowing the ultimate limit that the caps impose.  The cap non-
disclosure clause has been touted as a method of maintaining the 
“integrity” of jury damages calculations: if informed of the caps, jurors 
could purposely attempt to evade them or might be unconsciously biased 
by the cap number.17  A variety of others, including courts and 
commentators, have suggested that non-disclosure of damage caps, more 
generally, should be the rule whenever a damage cap exists.18   
However, this effort to preserve a jury’s decision-making 
integrity by not discussing the caps forces courts and attorneys to 
conceal the true state of the law and may exact a toll on public 
confidence in the justice system.  This article explores the potential 
broad effects on the jury system of the failure to disclose damage caps.  
In order to better understand the context of disclosure versus non-
disclosure, we first examine the psychological effects that knowledge, as 
opposed to ignorance, of the caps could have on jury decision-making 
processes and damage awards.  We then turn to an examination of the 
potential effects that ignorance of the caps may have on perceptions of 
the legal process.  Ultimately, we conclude that despite the effects that 
knowledge of the caps may have on a jury’s damages award, jurors 
should be informed of the caps, both to retain public confidence in the 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (2004); TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. § 41.008 (Vernon 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 2004). 
15 Commentators suggest that such tort damage awards pass along great costs to 
ordinary citizens.  For example, Albert Yoon suggests that medical malpractice 
produces an astronomical amount of costs—between $17 and $29 billion per year.  
Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical 
Malpractice Litigation in the South, 27 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 199, 200 (2001). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2). 
17 Kang, supra note 5, at 470. 
18 Id. at 478–79; see also American College of Trial Lawyers Committee on 
Special Problems in the Administration of Justice, Report on Punitive Damages 15 
(1989), available at http://www.actl.com/PDFs/ReportOnPunitiveDamages.pdf; 
Thomas v. Sanford, 663 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Ark. 1984); State v. Bouras, 423 N.E.2d 
741, 744 (Ind. App. 1981).  But see Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1040 (1st Cir. 
1996) (finding no abuse of discretion in informing jurors about a Massachusetts state 
cap); Vendrell v. School District, 360 P.2d 282, 292 (Or. 1961) (holding that jury must 
be informed of state statutory limit on recovery against school district). 
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justice system and to give jurors guidance in making the proper damages 
determination.  It may seem remarkable to advocate providing jurors 
with information that has the potential, in light of knowledge of 
psychological decision-making principles, to “taint” their ultimate 
decisions.  However, procedural justice concerns make clear that 
withholding this information has the potential to taint the legitimacy of 
the jury system as a whole.   
In Part I, we discuss the legislative history and judicial 
interpretation of the cap non-disclosure clause, with an eye toward the 
purpose behind the clause.  In Part II, we discuss the potential effects of 
disclosure and non-disclosure of the cap on jury damage awards in light 
of psychological models of decision-making.  In Part III, we discuss 
potential effects of the concealed cap on perceptions of the justice 
system, in particular examining procedural justice effects.  Finally, in 
Part IV, we argue for a system of disclosure that would use the caps to 
guide jurors to the correct assessment of compensatory and punitive 
damages. 
 
I 
NON-DISCLOSURE OF THE CAPS:  
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
 
 The 1991 Civil Rights Act is a many-faceted piece of legislation, 
dealing with issues such as disparate impact claims,19 the “business 
necessity” defense,20 and the right to a jury trial.21  The Act followed in 
the wake of several Supreme Court decisions that curtailed or eliminated 
the rights and remedies available to victims of employment 
discrimination.22 One of Congress’s primary goals was to reverse these 
decisions directly by rewriting the civil rights statutes.23  However, the 
Act cited an additional purpose to “provide appropriate remedies for 
                                                 
19  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000). 
20 Id.  § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
21 Id. § 1981a(c)(1). 
22 Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis 
of the Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923, 
924 (1993). 
23 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, § 3.  For example, the Act specifically 
restores the definitions of such statutory terms as “business necessity” and “job related” 
to the Court’s definitions as they existed prior to the decision in Wards Cove Packing 
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).  105 Stat. 1071, § 3(2); see also id. § 3(4) (noting 
that another purpose is “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by 
expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate 
protection to victims of discrimination”). 
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intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace.”24  
The Act did this by allowing federal employment discrimination 
plaintiffs to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the first 
time.25  Punitive damages were only allowed when the plaintiff 
demonstrated that the employer had engaged in the discriminatory 
practice “with malice or reckless indifference” to the plaintiff’s civil 
rights.26  In addition, the Act placed a limit on the total compensatory 
and punitive damages that each plaintiff could receive.27  The actual 
damage cap was based on the number of employees working for the 
employer; the cap began at $50,000 for employers with less than 101 
employees, and rose to $300,000 for employers with more than 500 
employees.28  However, the Act specified that if the case was tried before 
a jury (a new possibility created by the Act itself), and the plaintiff 
sought compensatory or punitive damages, “the court shall not inform 
the jury of the limitations described [above].”29 
 In order to dissect the purpose of this non-disclosure provision, 
we begin below by discussing the legislative intent as manifested in the 
legislative history of the provision.  We then turn to how courts have 
interpreted the provision, including its secondary effects. 
 
A. Legislative History: Lost in the Shuffle 
 
 Like prior civil rights statutes, the 1991 Civil Rights Act was 
passed only after taking a circuitous and controversial path.30   As noted 
above, the 1988 Supreme Court term saw a number of controversial 
decisions that cut back on the protections provided by federal 
employment discrimination law, particularly Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.  In response to these decisions, the House of Representatives 
approved H.R. 4000, entitled the Civil Rights Act of 1990.  The bill 
                                                 
24 Id. § 3(1). 
25 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2000) (providing that “the complaining party may 
recover compensatory and punitive damages”). 
26 Id. § 1981a(b)(1). 
27 Id. § 1981a(b)(3).  The Supreme Court has determined that “front pay”—namely, 
money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and 
reinstatement (or in lieu of reinstatement)—is not considered compensatory damages 
and is thus not covered by the cap.  Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 
843, 852 (2001). 
28 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).  The Act counted employees as those having worked 
“in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.”  Id. 
29 Id. § 1981a(c)(2). 
30 See Nicole L. Gueron, Note, An Idea Whose Time Has Come: A Comparative 
Procedural History of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 1964, and 1991, 104 YALE L.J. 
1201, 1203 (1995) (citing 136 Cong. Rec. H6810-13 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990)). 
 DAMAGE CAPS 6 
provided for substantial amendments of the federal law of employment 
discrimination, including compensatory and punitive damages for 
victims of intentional discrimination.31  During congressional debate, the 
bill received criticism for its uncapped damages provisions.32  An 
identical bill was proposed in the Senate and was reported favorably out 
of committee.33  However, the bill was later amended to add a $150,000 
cap to compensatory and punitive damages.34  The House and Senate 
passed the bill as amended, but President Bush vetoed it.35  An attempt to 
override the veto failed by one vote in the Senate.36 
 The House bill was resubmitted with minor changes in 1991 as 
H.R. 1, the “Civil Rights and Women’s Equity in Employment Act.”37  
According to the House Report, one of the bill’s two primary purposes 
was “to strengthen existing protections and remedies available under 
federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and 
adequate compensation for victims of discrimination.”38  Noting that 
compensatory and punitive damages were available under 42 U.S.C. § 
1981 for victims of intentional race discrimination, the report noted that 
a “serious gap” existed for victims of intentional discrimination on the 
basis of sex or religion.39  As did the 1990 bill, H.R. 1 provided for 
uncapped compensatory and punitive damages.40 The House Report 
dismissed concerns about excessive verdicts by noting that “juries are 
fully capable of determining whether an award of damages is appropriate 
and if so, how large it must be to compensate the plaintiff adequately and 
                                                 
31 H.R. Res. 4000 § 8, 101st Cong. (1990). 
32 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II), at 71 (May 17, 1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 757 (“You can show people all the studies that reveal that punitive 
damage awards in the past have not been for astronomical amounts ... But I can tell you 
that it is small comfort if you are on the receiving end of a lawsuit where the allegation 
is for say $3 or $4 million in punitive damages. That is your exposure. When somebody 
files a lawsuit against you and they say, ‘I am entitled to $10,000 in compensatory 
damages and $5 million in punitive damages,’ it will ruin your whole night's sleep.” 
(quoting Sen. Dale Bumpers)). 
33 S. 2104 (101st Cong. 1990); S. Rep. No. 101-315 (1990). 
34 Gueron, supra note 30, at 1203 (citing 136 Cong. Rec. H6810-13 (daily ed. Aug. 
2, 1990)). 
35 Gueron, supra note 30, at 1203; Roger Clegg, An Introduction: A Brief 
Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459, 1465 (1994). 
36 Gueron, supra note 30, at 1203; Clegg, supra note 35, at 1465. 
37 H.R. 1, 102d Cong. (1991). 
38 H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II) 1 (May 17, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
694.  The other purpose was to "respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by 
restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions."  
Id.   
39 Id. at 24, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 717. 
40 See H.R. 1 § 206, 102d Cong. (1991). 
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to deter future repetition of the prohibited conduct.”41  The minority 
report, however, feared that uncapped damages would lead to “a 
litigation generating machine” with “huge awards” in the millions of 
dollars.42 
H.R. 1 was amended in June 1991 to include a cap on punitive 
damages, but compensatory damages remained uncapped.43  The House 
approved the bill as amended, but the Senate never voted on it.  Instead, 
the Senate passed its own version, which included both the caps and the 
non-disclosure requirement.  The House eventually approved the Senate 
version, which President Bush signed into law. At the signing, the 
President said the following about the caps contained in the bill: 
 
Another important source of the controversy that delayed 
enactment of this legislation was a proposal to authorize jury 
trials and punitive damages in cases arising under Title VII.  S. 
1745 adopts a compromise under which ‘caps’ have been 
placed on the amount that juries may award in such cases.  The 
adoption of these limits on jury awards sets an important 
precedent, and I hope to see this model followed as part of an 
initiative to reform the Nation's tort system.44 
 
Soon after the 1991 Civil Rights Act was signed into law, the “Equal 
Remedies Act of 1991” was proposed in the Senate.45  The bill would 
have removed the damage caps and the non-disclosure provision from 
the code.46  However, it failed to pass.47 
                                                 
41 H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (I) 72 (April 24, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
610.   
42 H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II) 143, 153 (May 17, 1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 672, 682.   
43 137 Cong. Rec. H3922, H3924 (June 5, 1991).  The cap limited punitive 
damages to $150,000 or the sum of compensatory and equitable relief awarded 
(whichever was greater). 
44 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 768, 769 (Nov. 21, 1991). 
45 S. 2062 (102d Cong. Nov. 26, 1991). 
46 The committee report on the bill argued that the removal of the caps was 
necessary to insure that women, religious minorities, and people with disabilities had 
the same access to damages as racial and ethnic minorities.  S. Rep. No. 102-286, at 5 
(1992) (“Congress has created a system which values injuries suffered by women, 
people with disabilities, and certain religious minorities less than the same injuries 
suffered by racial or ethnic minorities.”).  According to the report, Congress accepted 
the restrictions on damages “[i]n the interest of securing prompt passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, including the portion guaranteeing the right to damages,” and “left 
to 1992 the task of providing full, fair, and equal remedies for victims of 
discrimination.”  Id. at 3.  The committee minority, however, noted that the caps were 
“part of the compromise on last year's civil rights legislation approved overwhelmingly 
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The legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act contains little 
specific discussion of the non-disclosure requirement.  One reason may 
be that the House Report was prepared for a bill that did not have 
statutory damage caps, let alone a non-disclosure provision.48  However, 
Senator John Danforth, one of the Senate bill's co-sponsors and reputedly 
the driving force behind the final compromise bill,49 did provide this 
discussion on jury discretion and knowledge of the caps: “[T]he bill 
specifically provides that the jury shall not be informed of the existence or 
amount of the caps on damage awards.  Thus, no pressure, upward or 
downward, will be exerted on the amount of jury awards by the existence of the 
statutory limitations.”50 
 The effects of the cap, according to Senator Danforth, thus 
appear to be the potential for “pressure” to move damages “upward or 
downward” from where they would have been without disclosure of the 
cap.  Senator Danforth does not explain why this pressure is to be 
avoided, or whether damages are more likely to be moved upward or 
downward if the caps were to be revealed. 
There appears to have been little investigation by Congress into 
the potential effects that hiding the caps would have, not only on jury 
awards but also on jurors, judges, and attorneys.  While the wisdom of 
cap non-disclosure was lost in the shuffle of legislative compromise, 
courts have been left to determine the scope and legal effect of the non-
disclosure provision. 
 
B. Judicial Interpretation: Integrity vs. Reallocation 
 
 Although other provisions of the 1991 Act have received 
extensive judicial exegesis, the cap non-disclosure provision has gotten 
only limited attention.  The non-disclosure provision has arisen in two 
contexts, one which involves the provision directly and the other which 
involves an indirect consequence of the provision.  These contexts are 
considered below. 
                                                                                                                       
by the House of Representatives and the Senate.”  Id. at 20.  The minority argued that 
capped damages represented "a significant expansion of the remedies” provided under 
Title VII, and “unrestricted damages will lead to a litigation explosion [and will] result 
in excessive damage awards that may be harmful to the financial health of the firm.”  
Id. at 21. 
47 Two bills in the prior Congress proposed to eliminate the caps on compensatory 
and punitive damages.  See S. 2088 § 532 (108th Cong. Feb. 12, 2004); H.R. 3809 § 532 
(108th Cong. Feb. 11, 2004). 
48 See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (I) 64-65 (April 24, 1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 602-03.  
49 See Clegg, supra note 35, at 1469–70. 
50 137 Cong. Rec. S15484 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Sen. Danforth). 
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1. Direct context: Who can tell the jury what?  
 
The § 1981a non-disclosure provision states that “the court shall 
not inform the jury” about the statutory cap.51  Read literally, the 
provision would seem to prohibit only judges from explaining or 
discussing the damages limitations. In Sasaki v. Class,52 however, the 
Fourth Circuit held that attorneys were also prohibited from disclosing 
the cap, or its effects, to jurors.53  The plaintiff in Sasaki brought suit 
against the employer alleging sexual harassment under Title VII as well 
as assault and battery under state tort law.54  During his closing 
argument, plaintiff’s counsel indicated to the jury that it could award the 
plaintiff “up to $50,000” in compensatory damages on the sexual 
harassment claim, and “up to $500,000” on the state tort claim.55  While 
counsel did not explicitly inform the jury about the caps, he did contrast 
the two different claims and noted that the state law damage provision 
“is generous here.”56  Ultimately, the jury awarded Plaintiff $61,250 in 
damages on the sexual harassment claim,57 $150,000 in compensatory 
damages  on the state law claim, and $65,000 in punitive damages.58 
The Fourth Circuit determined that counsel had violated 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) by revealing the existence of the caps to the jury.59  
The court acknowledged that the statute literally only prohibits the 
“court” from informing the jury about the caps.60  However, it held that 
“Congress clearly intended this restriction to prohibit anyone from 
bringing the caps to the jury’s attention.”61  In discussing the purpose of 
the provision, the court cited Senator Danforth’s argument that the non-
disclosure clause would eliminate the potential for the caps to exert 
“pressure, upward or downward” on damages.62  Noting that the caps 
themselves were “enacted in apparent response to a concern about 
runaway verdicts,” the court posited that the non-disclosure clause was 
                                                 
51 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) (2000). 
52 92 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 1996). 
53 Id. at 234. 
54 Id. at 235. 
55 Id. at 235–36. 
56 Id. at 236. 
57 This amount fell below the cap, as plaintiff was awarded $11,250 in back pay, 
which is not counted against the cap. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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enacted “because ‘legislators would likely fear that juries would award 
the maximum or would otherwise adjust their awards if told of the 
statutory limit.’”63  The court found strong reason to believe that the jury 
had, in fact, tailored its damages verdict to circumvent the cap.  
Although the acts covered by the state tort claims (unwanted touching) 
were included within the sexual harassment claim, the jury awarded 
almost three times the damages for that claim.  Moreover, the jury 
adhered to plaintiff’s counsel’s suggested damages on the harassment 
claim by not going above counsel’s suggested maximum.  The court 
found that the jury “appears to have faithfully followed [plaintiff’s] 
counsel’s directions” and “almost undoubtedly adjusted its award to 
account for the federal cap.”64  According to the court, “[t]he jury here 
likely reacted in precisely the manner that Congress specifically feared, 
and which it attempted to preclude through the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 
1981a.”65  Finding that counsel’s statement was not harmless error, the 
court remanded for a new trial on damages.66 
In an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit agreed with Sasaki’s 
conclusion that the cap non-disclosure clause extends to counsel as well 
as the courts.67  However, the court found that counsel’s reference was 
harmless, because there was “no indication it had any effect on the jury’s 
award.”68  The jury awarded $300,000 in punitive damages, the statutory 
maximum, on plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim—her only claim.  
The court reasoned that the jury’s knowledge of the caps did not change 
its award: 
 
From a practical standpoint, if the jury felt [defendant’s] 
conduct warranted less than $300,000 in punitive damages, 
there is no reason to believe the mention of the limit on 
punitive damages would have caused the jury to increase the 
award.  If the jury believed that [defendant’s] conduct 
warranted more than $300,000, its knowledge of the cap did 
nothing more than limit the jury’s award to the lesser amount, 
which the district court would have done in any event had the 
                                                 
63 Id. at 237 (quoting Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension 
Between Legislative Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 347 n.8 (1995)). 
64 Sasaki, 92 F.3d at 237. 
65 Id.   
66 Id. at 243. 
67 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. EMC Corp., 205 F.3d 1339 (Table), 
2000 WL 191819 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2000).  Interestingly, the reference to the caps was 
made by an attorney for the EEOC.  See id. at *8 (noting that EEOC counsel said to the 
jury that $300,000 was “the most we can ask for” and “[i]f we could, we would ask for 
a lot more”). 
68 Id. at *9. 
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jury returned a larger verdict.69 
 
The dissenting judge disagreed, however: 
 
An inescapable inherent risk exists that the jurors in this case 
experienced pressure to award $300,000 in punitive damages, 
instead of a lesser sum, in response to a misconceived 
perception that Congress had foreordained that an employer of 
[defendant’s] size which satisfied the requisites for punitive 
liability . . . should be punished in the amount of $300,000.70 
 
As these divergent opinions show, judges have intuitive—and conflicting 
—notions about the effects that knowledge of the caps may have, 
ranging from (1) the caps will have no effect to (2) jurors will 
misunderstand the caps to (3) jurors will understand and circumvent the 
caps. 
 Although courts have disagreed on the likely effects of the non-
disclosure clause, there is agreement that the statutory caps do not affect 
the amount of damages that a plaintiff may request from the jury, in part 
because of the non-disclosure provision.  In a number of cases, 
defendants argued that the court should strike down plaintiffs’ prayers 
for relief because these prayers exceeded the statutorily-provided 
damage limitations.71  However, courts have rejected this argument on 
the basis of the non-disclosure provision.  By forcing plaintiffs to limit 
their claims to the statutory cap, a court “would in effect inform the jury 
of the damage caps.”72  One court also suggested that forcing a plaintiff 
to request only the capped amount would hinder the plaintiff’s ability to 
demonstrate “the relative importance of her different damages claims,” 
thereby impairing the plaintiff’s credibility.73  Instead, courts have 
determined that the proper procedure is to allow the plaintiff to request 
                                                 
69 Id.  The court also noted that since the employer had failed to object at trial when 
the statutory limit was mentioned, the employer had the burden of showing that 
counsel’s conduct was “outrageous” or “egregious.”  Id. at *8. 
70 Id. at *15 (Krupansky, J., dissenting). 
71 See, e.g., Johnson v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 926 F. Supp. 874, 876 (E.D. 
Minn. 1996); Beam v. Concord Hospitality, Inc., 1996 WL 455020, at *5 (D. Kan. July 
8, 1996); Solomon v. Godwin & Carlton, P.C., 898 F. Supp. 415, 416 (N.D. Tex. 1995); 
Haltek v. Village of Park Forest, 864 F. Supp. 802, 807 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
72 Haltek, 864 F. Supp. at 807; see also Johnson, 926 F. Supp. at 876; Beam, 1996 
WL 455020 at *6; Solomon, 898 F. Supp. at 417.  It is unclear whether these courts 
were suggesting that (1) plaintiffs would be entitled to explain their damages award, 
thereby exposing the damage cap, or (2) jurors would intuit the presence of a cap by the 
clipped nature of plaintiff’s prayer for relief. 
73 Beam, 1996 WL 455020 at *6. 
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an unlimited amount and then to reduce the actual damages awarded if 
they rise above the cap.74 
 
2.  Indirect effects: How should damages be apportioned between federal 
and state claims?   
 
Federal antidiscrimination protections such as Title VII are not 
the only employment discrimination statutes available to employees.  
States and localities also provide statutory antidiscrimination protections, 
and federal provisions do not preempt these protections.75  States are 
even permitted to go beyond the federal provisions in their coverage or 
relief.76  These provisions may seem superfluous if a plaintiff is 
protected by a federal statute, but many of these statutes provide for 
uncapped compensatory and/or punitive damages.77  Because of this 
potential difference, a plaintiff may be entitled to significantly lower 
relief under the federal statute than under the state or local statute.   
Given the potential for different relief for the same underlying 
offense, judges and juries must grapple with how to apportion relief 
between the capped federal statute and an uncapped state statute.  The 
Sasaki case provides an illustration of this.  In Sasaki, the plaintiff 
brought a federal claim (capped at $50,000) and a state tort claim 
(capped at $500,000) based on the same underlying sexual harassment.78  
The plaintiff’s attorney suggested to the jury that it award the maximum 
amount under the federal claim, and then provide for further damages 
under the state claim.79  And as the court noted, the jury appeared to 
follow these instructions, awarding the statutory maximum on the federal 
claim and $215,000 in compensatory and punitive damages on the state 
claim.80   The Sasaki court believed that the non-disclosure provision 
was designed to prevent such award structuring.81  According to the 
court, such award shifting was what “Congress specifically feared” about 
                                                 
74 Johnson, 926 F. Supp. at 876; Solomon, 898 F. Supp. at 417; Haltek, 864 F. 
Supp. at 807. 
75 Stephen F. Befort, Demystifying Federal Labor and Employment Law 
Preemption, 13 LAB. LAW. 429, 440–41 (1998). 
76 Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987). 
77 For a table outlining the availability of punitive damages in state employment 
discrimination statutes, see Stacy A. Hickox, Reduction of Punitive Damages for 
Employment Discrimination: Are Courts Ignoring our Juries?, 54 MERCER L. REV. 
1081, 1123–32 (2003). 
78 Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d 232, 235–36 (4th Cir. 1996). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 235. 
81 Id. at 237. 
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cap awareness and thus why Congress had included the non-disclosure 
provisions.82 
The D.C. Circuit does not agree that Congress wanted to prohibit 
award-shifting.  In Martini v. Federal National Mortgage Association,83 
plaintiff brought harassment and retaliation claims under both Title VII 
and the D.C. Human Rights Act.  The district court instructed the jury to 
award damages not only based on the type of claim (i.e., harassment or 
retaliation), but also based on the statute (federal or local law).84  The 
jury awarded a total of nearly $7 million in damages, including $3 
million in punitive damages under the Title VII claims and almost $2 
million in compensatory and punitive damages on the D.C. Human 
Rights claims.85  The district court then applied the $300,000 cap to the 
Title VII damages.  The D.C. Circuit, however, held that the district 
court should have reallocated the excess Title VII damages to the 
plaintiff's recovery under the D.C. Human Rights Act.86  Noting that the 
district court had provided the same instructions for the federal and local 
claims, the court held that the jury had no legal basis for distinguishing 
between the statutes.87  Thus, for example, if the jury had awarded $2 
million in punitive damages under the plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation 
claim and $1 million in punitive damages under the D.C. Human Rights 
retaliation claim, “the most sensible inference is that the jury sought to 
impose a total of $3 million in punitive damages against [defendant] for 
retaliation.”88  Thus, while only $300,000 of those damages could be 
awarded under Title VII, the district court should have reallocated the 
other $1.7 million to the local claim.  The court stated: “Were we not to 
treat damages under federal and local law as fungible where the 
standards of liability are the same, we would effectively limit the local 
jurisdiction's prerogative to provide greater remedies for employment 
discrimination than those Congress has afforded under Title VII.”89 
  Most courts have held that district courts have discretion to 
reallocate a total damages award between state and federal claims.90  
                                                 
82 Id. 
83 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
84 Id. at 1349. 
85 Id. at 1339. 
86 Id. at 1349. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1349. 
89 Id. at 1349–50.  The court held that "[s]uch a result would violate Title VII's 
express terms" that the Act was not intended to relieve defendants of liability under 
state law.  Id. at 1350. 
90 Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2002); Passatino 
v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 510 (9th Cir. 2000); 
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Courts have been willing to shuffle the monetary awards between claims 
in order to maximize the plaintiff’s recovery, particularly if the jury has 
jointly allocated the damages to the state and federal claims.  For 
example, in Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Products, Inc.,91 
the plaintiff brought both Title VII claims and claims under the 
Washington State Law Against Discrimination.92  The jury found for the 
plaintiff, awarding her backpay as well as $1 million in compensatory 
damages and $8.6 million in punitive damages.  The district court 
allocated all of the $1 million compensatory damages to the state claim, 
and all of the punitive damages to federal claim.93  This allocation 
maximized plaintiff’s recovery, as under state law compensatory 
damages were uncapped, but punitive damages were not permitted.94  
The Ninth Circuit upheld this allocation.  The court noted: “An 
allocation that would serve to reduce lawfully awarded damages would 
fail to respect the jury’s verdict and conflict with the purpose and intent 
of one or both statutes.”95 
 Courts thus appear to have two distinct viewpoints on the 1991 
Civil Rights Act damage caps and their non-disclosure to the jury.  One 
perspective prizes the jurors’ ignorance of the caps as a way of insuring 
that the jury does its work without an understanding of the ultimate 
outcome.  If jurors were told of the cap, this perspective fears, they 
would engage in gamesmanship with any non-capped damages and 
circumvent the purpose of the caps.  The other perspective views the 
caps as a procedural rule that plays only a limited role within the entire 
process.  Judges are permitted to reallocate jurors’ damage awards in an 
effort to give the greatest possible recovery to the plaintiff.  It seems 
clear that under this perspective there would be little problem with 
                                                                                                                       
Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 576 (8th Cir. 1997); Barrios v. Kody 
Marine, Inc., 2000 WL 775067, at *4 (E.D. La. June 14, 2000); Luciano v. Olsten 
Corp., 912 F. Supp., 663, 675 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d on other grounds, 110 F.3d 210 
(2d Cir. 1997); Channon v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 851 (Iowa 
2001).  But see Oliver v. Cole Gift Centers, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 109, 113 (D. Conn. 
2000) (applying federal cap to total recovery under federal and state law, but also 
noting that plaintiff was “adequately compensated” by the capped amount). 
91 212 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2000). 
92 Id. at 503. 
93 Id. at 509–10. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 510.  See also Barrios, 2000 WL 775067 at *4 (arguing that when the jury 
fails to allocate awards between claims, “it is most consistent with the intent of the jury 
to permit Plaintiff to recover the maximum amount possible”); Channon, 629 N.W.2d 
at 851 (holding that limiting damages to the federal cap amount “effectively limits 
[Iowa’s] prerogative to provide greater remedies under our civil rights statute than those 
available under Title VII”). 
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informing jurors about the caps, if doing so were permitted.  Informing 
the jurors would obviate the need for any post hoc reallocation, as the 
jurors would be able to do this themselves.  However, neither perspective 
accounts for the possibility that knowledge of the caps will affect the 
jurors’ calculations in ways other than simple reallocation.  We 
undertake an examination of these effects below. 
 
II 
EFFECTS OF CAPS ON JUROR DAMAGE DETERMINATIONS 
 
From the sole comment in the legislative history about the 
rationale for non-disclosure of the damage caps, it seems that the goal of 
non-disclosure is to preserve the status quo—the integrity—of jury 
deliberations.  Non-disclosure prevents pressure, “upward or 
downward,” 96 even while exerting control on the jury’s ability to impose 
a verdict above the cap amount.  So, while the cap clearly signals an 
effort to lower federal employment discrimination verdicts, the non-
disclosure provision has no such obvious directional purpose behind it.   
By keeping juries ignorant of damage caps, legislators imply that 
juries will be unable to compensate adequately for the effects of knowing 
about the caps and will take the caps into account in making their 
damages awards.  In making this assumption, legislators appear to be 
cognizant of the jurors as human decision-makers who may not always 
follow a rational-actor model.  Psychologists and others who study 
decision-making have relied on both normative and descriptive models 
to explain and envision the decision-making process; an examination of 
decision-making models indicates that knowledge of the damage caps 
may well influence juries.    
Normative models of decision-making show how the fully 
rational decision-maker would optimally make decisions based on a 
certain set of rational assumptions.  The classic normative analysis is 
“expected utility theory”—that is, rational decision makers will seek to 
maximize their expected utility.97  To do so, a rational decision maker 
should calculate the utility of each choice available.  The utility of each 
possible outcome, given any one choice, is calculated and then weighted 
by its probability.  For example, if Choice A produces a 10% chance of 
Outcome 1 and a 90% chance of Outcome 2, then choice A’s utility is 
(utility of outcome 1 x .10) + (utility of outcome 2 x .90).  Choice A’s 
utility would then be compared to the utility of other potential choices.  
                                                 
96 137 Cong. Rec. S15484 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Sen. Danforth). 
97 SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 80–83 
(1993). 
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The ultimate decision would be easily made in accordance with the 
dominance principle, which suggests that a rational decision maker will 
never choose an option that has less expected utilty than a different 
option.  Simply put, if one option, choice A, has more utility (e.g., is 
better) than another option, choice B, a decision-maker will prefer and 
thus select choice A over choice B.98   
Another principle that is relevant in expected utility theory, 
invariance, refers to the idea that varying descriptions of a choice should 
not impact which choice is made.99  Whether one describes a choice in 
terms of awarding money to a plaintiff or taking it from defendant, for 
instance, should not impact the decision maker, if the monetary amounts 
are in fact identical in both alternatives.   
A jury composed of “rational actors” would use expected utility 
theory to determine the optimal damages award for a plaintiff.  
Knowledge of a damage cap would not influence such jurors’ 
assessments of appropriate damages, except to eliminate any choice 
involving damages higher than the cap.  Take, for instance, a jury that 
does not know of a cap of $300,000 and rationally weighs damages 
awards of $50,000, $80,000, and $110,000. Using a utility theory 
approach, the jury might decide that $80,000 is the most appropriate 
figure.  With knowledge of the cap, this decision would not change, 
because the caps do not change the utility or permissibility of the 
available choices; rather, it merely limits the available choices to a range 
that the jury already believes is appropriate.  
Consider, however, a jury that is deliberating between $400,000, 
$600,000 and $800,000.  Under a normative approach to decision-
making, the jury might arrive at $600,000.  With knowledge of a 
$300,000 cap, however, the jury will act rationally in awarding the 
maximum damages figure of $300,000, because it will account for the 
fact that its award would be higher but for the existence of the caps.100  
Under a utility theory approach, knowledge of the caps will not change 
juries’ assessments of damages awards, except that those awards that fall 
above the cap range will all be considered as equal to the cap and each 
other.  Indeed, knowledge of the caps under this framework would only 
act to maximize the efficiency of a rationally-acting jury:  any debate or 
discussion about varying awards over the cap would be unnecessary.   
                                                 
98 Id. at 81. 
99 Id. at 82. 
100 The court in Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. EMC Corp. espoused 
this notion of rationality.  Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. EMC Corp., 205 
F.3d 1339 (Table), 2000 WL 191819, at *9 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2000).   
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Presumably, then, since revealing the caps would make jury 
deliberations faster and more efficient for a jury governed by expected 
utility theory, Congress did not expect such a jury.  And, in fact, 
although normative principles have intuitive logical appeal, research has 
consistently shown that human decision-makers deviate significantly 
from normative decision-making principles.  Descriptive decision-
making models, heuristics, and decision-making phenomena account for 
human patterns of behavior that normative theories do not explain.101  An 
examination of these descriptive models, heuristics, and phenomena in 
light of knowledge of the caps shows how such knowledge might affect 
jury verdicts.   
As explained below, anchoring is perhaps the most robust and 
widely discussed psychological phenomenon that would come into play 
in jury damage deliberations.  It is not clear, however, that anchoring is 
the sole potential effect that revealing the caps would produce.  Below, 
we consider anchoring as well as several other decision-making 
paradigms that could potentially result in altering juries’ damages awards 
in light of knowledge of the caps.  An examination of these paradigms 
suggests that knowledge of the caps could have both a quantitative 
impact, affecting the ultimate numerical figure of the damage award, 
either upward or downward, and a qualitative impact, making a 
difference in how the jury arrives at its decision. 
 
A.  Anchoring and Adjustment 
 
Psychological research has marshaled strong evidence for the 
phenomena of anchoring and adjustment,102 in which the first number 
with which a decision-maker is presented has a demonstrable effect on 
that person’s ultimate choice.  In essence, the first number heard 
becomes the place away from which any adjustment is made.  Anchoring 
effects are powerful, widespread, and have been found in a variety of 
contexts.  The source of the anchoring first number need not even be tied 
to any rational source; indeed, the groundbreaking initial research on 
anchoring demonstrated that anchoring effects were robust even when 
subjects believed the first number to be randomly generated.103  In one 
                                                 
101 Commentators have noted that there is a discrepancy between normative 
decision-making theory and actual jury practice.  See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Barbara A. 
Mellers, Do Juries Meet Our Expectations?  26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 625 (2002).   
102 We refer to the phenomenon of “anchoring and adjustment” simply as 
anchoring throughout this section.   
103 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:  Heuristics 
and Biases, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1974).   
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example, researchers found that first asking whether the average 
temperature in San Francisco was above or below 558 degrees 
Fahrenheit resulted in higher estimates of the actual average temperature 
than those given by people who had not been asked the first question.104  
In situations where jurors learn of a damage cap, empirical 
research has shown that there is a strong anchoring effect.105  Juries 
make damage determinations by effectively moving “away from” the 
stated cap to the degree they believe appropriate.  Such anchoring effects 
have been found in studies testing the impact of punitive damage caps on 
mock jurors.106  As Michael Saks and his colleagues have found, 
however, caps have differing effects on damage awards in low-severity, 
medium-severity, and high-severity injury settings.107  In his juror 
simulation study, individuals were presented with one of three 
hypothetical injury scenarios and asked to make a damage award.  Some 
individuals were advised of the existence of a damage cap of $250,000 
“to provide [them] some guidance” in making their determinations; 
others were given no guidance or other forms of guidance, including 
average awards or ranges of most awards.  In the low-severity case 
scenario, the cap produced higher awards than either no information or 
other forms of guidance; in the medium-severity case, the cap produced a 
similar outcome to the no information condition, but a higher outcome 
than other forms of guidance yielded.  Finally, in the high-severity case, 
the cap produced a lower average damage award than the control.  Thus 
the cap acted to inflate damage awards for low-severity injuries, but to 
deflate damage awards for high-severity injuries.108   
In a different juror simulation study, Jennifer Robbennolt and 
Christina Studebaker tested for anchoring effects by holding the severity 
of the injury constant and instead altering the amount of the damage 
cap.109  They found that knowledge of damage caps influences mock 
jurors’ damages awards in both upward and downward directions, 
depending on the size of the caps.  For example, in one experiment, the 
mean damage award made by individuals who were not given any 
information about a cap was approximately $5 million; those who were 
                                                 
104 PLOUS, supra note 97, at 146. 
105 Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the 
Courtroom:  The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 
367 (1999); Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 243, 251-52 (1997). 
106 Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 105, at 367; Saks et al., supra note 105, at 
251–52. 
107 Saks et al., supra note 105, at 251–52. 
108  Id. 
109 Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra  note 105, at 367.  
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told of a $100,000 cap awarded an average of $83,100, while those who 
were told of a $50 million cap awarded an average of $9 million.110  
Thus, high caps acted to inflate jury damage awards, while low caps 
acted to deflate damage awards.111        
Empirical research, then, reveals that damage caps do have the 
potential to affect jury decision-making; however, it is not clear whether 
anchoring effects around the § 1981a damage cap would act largely to 
inflate or to depress damages awards.  For example, consider a jury that, 
if completely ignorant of the cap, might award $10,000,000 in damages 
for what it thinks is particularly egregious conduct.  If the jury learned of 
the cap, and thus anchored at $300,000, they might award that maximum 
or might adjust away to something less than $300,000, but their award 
could not go beyond the cap.  Thus, in the case of severe injury, 
anchoring effects could only act to deflate the damage award.  In 
contrast, consider a jury that would have otherwise awarded $20,000 in 
damages for minor injury.  If that jury were made aware of the $300,000 
cap, anchoring effects would likely pull the award higher than it would 
have been without the cap.112 
Anchoring effects of a damage cap cannot, of course, be 
considered in a vacuum; empirical research has repeatedly shown that 
the plaintiff’s demand for damages already acts as a psychological 
anchor for jurors.113  Thus, the “pure” jury deliberations that the non-
disclosure provision was designed to protect are already “tainted” by 
what the plaintiff114 has asked for, if the plaintiff is permitted to ask for 
damages in the jurisdiction.115  Especially in light of the fact that there 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 See also Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for 
Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 991 (1995). 
112 One might imagine that an easy solution would be to tell juries that they should 
deliberate about damages as though there were no caps, but tell them about the caps to 
increase their efficiency.  Thus, they would eliminate any debate about choosing 
between damage awards higher than the cap, but they would still deliberate “normally” 
about damage awards they might be considering that fell below the cap.  However, 
numerous empirical studies have suggested that there is no way to offset such effects by 
expressly telling people to disregard certain information that they have already been 
given in making their decisions.  See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, 
Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgment and 
Evaluation. 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 130 (1994).  
113 EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES:  THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS 152–54 (2003).   
114 Studies have shown that the defendant’s counter-suggestion of a damage award 
also has a potent affect on the jury’s damages determination.  Mollie W. Marti & 
Roselle L. Wissler, Be Careful What You Ask For:  The Effect of Anchors on Personal 
Injury Damages Awards, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:  APPLIED 91, 99   (2000).   
115 Some jurisdictions do not permit plaintiffs or defendants to suggest a particular 
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are no restrictions on numbers plaintiffs’ attorneys propose, concern over 
anchoring around the caps may be misguided.  Indeed, forcing attorneys 
to keep their demands in line with what caps permit would create far 
more consistency in anchoring than already occurs within jury 
deliberation because the anchoring would always be at the cap 
number.116 
Despite the empirical work on the effects of disclosed damage 
caps on jury awards, it is difficult to predict what actual effects would 
occur in the § 1981a context in the absence of empirical data regarding 
the average size of a damage demand for federal employment 
discrimination cases or the average size of damage awards.  It is not even 
clear what size employer is most often sued, meaning that the actual 
monetary level of the cap that would be applied in most cases is not 
certain.  For these reasons, the most likely directionality of any 
anchoring effects that disclosure of the caps might produce is not clear.  
However, these effects appear more likely to raise awards on the lower 
end of the scale and lower awards on the upper end of the scale. 
 
B.  Scaling 
 
Empirical research has consistently demonstrated that the way in 
which outcomes are described – that is, the framing of outcomes – does 
have significant effects on individuals’ choices, in contrast to the 
invariance principle of expected utility theory.117  Scaling is one type of 
framing effect with the potential to impact jurors’ decision-making in 
light of the disclosure of a damage cap.  Scaling occurs when 
individuals’ choices are affected by the presentation of "response scales," 
or ranges of possible response alternatives.118  Essentially, scaling means 
that the presentation of a number or numbers creates a mental scale that 
individuals use to calibrate choices.  For example, psychologist Norbert 
Schwarz and his colleagues asked individuals to estimate how much 
television they watched per day.119  When individuals were given a scale 
that went, at half-hour intervals, from a low end of one half hour to a 
high end of more than two and a half hours, only sixteen percent of 
                                                                                                                       
monetary damage figure.  GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 113, at 151. 
116 Caps have been shown empirically to have a similar anchoring effect on 
negotiated settlements.  Greg Pogarsky & Linda Babcock, Damage Caps, Motivated 
Anchoring, and Bargaining Impasse, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 153–57 (2001).    
117 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the 
Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S251–78 (1986). 
118 PLOUS, supra note 97, at 66–67.   
119 Norbert Schwarz et al., Response Scale: Effects of Category Range on Reported 
Behavior and Comparative Judgments, 49 PUB. OP. Q. 388, 389 (1985). 
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respondents said that they watched more than two and a half hours of 
television per day.120  But when individuals were given a scale that 
ranged from “up to” two and a half hours at the low end to more than 
four and a half hours at the high end, 37.5 percent of respondents said 
that they watched more than two and a half hours per day.121  Those 
using the lower value scale estimated the average citizen’s television 
viewing time at 2.7 hours, while those using the higher value scale 
estimated it at 3.2 hours.122   
Theorists have suggested that this result stems from people’s 
fundamental need to make conversational sense out of information that 
has been provided to them.123  People assume that information is 
provided because it is relevant to the task at hand, and is assumed to be 
no more or less than is needed to complete the task.124  Take, for 
instance, the case of television viewing:  suppose one likes to think that 
one watches an average (or better yet, slightly below average) amount of 
television, but has not really bothered to count the actual time spent 
watching.  One will assume that the response scale provided by the 
questioner reflects an accurate assessment of the range of television 
viewing habits, from slight to heavy.  Thus, a responder will choose a 
point towards the lower end of the scale, regardless of what number is at 
that lower point.  As Schwarz shows, one would be less likely to choose 
the highest number offered, because it seems so unlikely that the end 
point of the scale would represent average or below average frequency.     
Jurors presented with the damage cap may experience a scaling 
effect, interpreting the maximum award amount as a measuring stick by 
                                                 
120 Id. at 390. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 390–91. 
123 Norbert Schwarz, Judgment in a Social Context:  Biases, Shortcomings, and the 
Logic of Conversation, in 26 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 123–
62 (Mark Zanna ed., 1994) 
124 Schwarz and others have suggested that these results stem from linguistic 
conventions.  Citing conversational principles developed by Paul Grice, Schwarz 
persuasively argues that research subjects read and process a survey or questionnaire as 
part of a normal conversation between researcher and subject, using Gricean maxims of 
quality, quantity, relation and manner.  Thus, research questions and statements will be 
assumed to provide no more or less information than necessary to answer the question; 
similarly, they will be assumed accurate and truthful.  Participants will assume that 
information provided is in some way relevant to the task, and finally, they will assume 
information is provided in a way that is meant to be understood.  See id.; see also Denis 
Hilton, Conversational Processes and Causal Explanation, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 65 
(1990); John F. Kihlstrom, Demand Characteristics in the Laboratory and the Clinic:  
Conversations and Collaborations with Subjects and Patients, 5 PREVENTION & 
TREATMENT article 36c (2002). 
 DAMAGE CAPS 22 
which to assess conduct.  Making “conversational” sense out of the cap 
might mean that Congress has told the jury that this is the largest amount 
of financial damage that one can sustain from a federal employment 
discrimination violation—and, in turn, if this is the largest amount of 
damage, then it must correspond to the most severe injury.  That is, a 
damage cap is a message from Congress (or the judge) to the jury that 
says that the worst conduct is to be redressed by damages in the amount 
of the cap.  It logically follows that less egregious conduct should be 
remedied by lower sums.  For example, knowledge that the cap for 
damages is $300,000 may prompt jurors to imagine that $100,000 
appropriately compensates a lesser degree of injury, $200,000 
compensates an intermediate degree of injury, and $300,000 
compensates the highest degree of injury.   
Without knowledge of the caps, juries may use plaintiffs’ 
requests for damages as the marker of a response scale:  for instance, if 
plaintiff alleges egregious conduct and asks for $10,000,000, a jury may 
decide that the conduct is only moderately severe, and award 
$5,000,000; that same jury faced with a plaintiff asking for $1,000,000 
might award $500,000.  On the other hand, jurors might disregard 
plaintiffs’ requests as self-interested and create their own scales for 
damages using other criteria.  
There is still an open question, as with anchoring, as to the most 
likely directionality of any scaling effects on verdicts.  Take a case 
where the jury believes that the injury is intermediate:  if their award 
without disclosure of the caps would have been $50,000, then scaling 
effects from the disclosure of the caps might raise their award to 
$200,000.  But if the jury would have awarded $1,000,000 for an 
intermediate injury, then scaling would act to lower it, even more than 
the mere cap at $300,000 would do.  The findings of Saks and his 
colleagues are, in fact, largely consistent with scaling effects, and 
suggest that scaling effects could increase the damage awards for lower 
injury cases.125 However, further empirical research is needed to assess 
how scaling effects might function.   
  
C.  Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion 
 
Prospect theory posits that people do not assess utility per se 
when making a decision; rather, they evaluate their options based on the 
resulting gain or loss from a starting reference point.126  Prospect theory 
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was expressly developed to explain research findings that showed that 
individuals consistently make decisions that do not conform to principles 
of expected utility theory.127  Prospect theory relies heavily on the 
concept that individuals are deeply affected by how decisions are 
framed.  Losses “loom” larger than gains, and decision-makers will take 
greater risk to avoid a loss than they would to reap a similar gain—that 
is, they are loss averse.128 
Without knowledge of a damage cap, a jury is likely to perceive 
any amount that it awards the plaintiff as a gain for the plaintiff.129  But 
in light of the existence of a damage cap, jurors may perceive any award 
that is less than the cap as a loss, and would be more averse to awarding 
a number below the cap than they would have otherwise been if ignorant 
of the cap.  Any loss-aversion effects due to knowledge of the damage 
caps, then, would exert upward pressure on damage awards.      
A related psychological phenomenon, the “endowment effect,”130 
similarly suggests that knowledge of the caps will produce higher awards 
than ignorance of the caps.  Under the endowment effect, people value 
the things that they already possess more highly than they would value 
those same things if they had to acquire them ab initio.131  Jurors 
learning of the cap may perceive it as consonant with a damages award 
itself.  Mentally perceiving the damage limit as a damage award that has 
already been awarded to the plaintiff could result in framing effects that 
code any award under the cap as a loss.  If such jurors identify with the 
plaintiff and perceive a lesser award as “giving up” money, they may act 
to prevent this from happening.   
The status quo bias, another psychological phenomenon based 
largely on the principle of loss aversion, may similarly exert upward 
pressure on the average damage award.  The status quo bias is a 
phenomenon whereby people remain at the status quo because 
disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than advantages.132  For this 
reason, jurors may latch on to the cap amount as the status quo and be 
                                                                                                                       
FRAMES 17, 18 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Certainly, it is possible that jurors also perceive this as a loss for the defendant, 
but once jurors have decided that liability exists, it seems far more likely that they will 
identify with the plaintiff than the defendant and will thus perceive the award, more 
generally, as a gain. 
130 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies:  The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND 
FRAMES 160–63 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, eds., 2000).    
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reluctant to award any lower amount.   
Both the endowment effect and the status quo bias seem more 
likely to occur with a damage cap than with a plaintiff’s request for 
damages, because jurors are likely to perceive the damages request as an 
aspiration by plaintiff, in contrast to an endowment or pronouncement by 
the legislature or court.  Theoretically, loss aversion effects are likely to 
increase damage awards in low or moderate-severity cases, where juries 
would otherwise have awarded damages in an amount below the cap, but 
would not have any impact on damage awards for very severe cases, in 
which juries would likely have awarded damages above the cap. This is 
largely consistent with the empirical findings of Saks and his colleagues, 
who found that low-severity cases received higher damages when jurors 
knew of a cap.133   
 
D.  Evasion and Reactance 
 
Knowledge of the existence of caps might simply cause jurors, 
acting rationally, to reapportion their damages award among the 
plaintiff’s different claims. For example, assume that jurors arrive at a 
damages figure that they believe appropriately responds to the particular 
needs of the plaintiff and the behavior of the defendant.  Knowledge of a 
cap that is less than that figure may prompt jurors to be creative in 
allocating damages to various claims, in essence evading the cap in order 
to provide the plaintiff with what they believe is the proper amount of 
damages.   
The court in Sasaki believed just such evasion had taken place 
when the jury awarded $61,250 in damages under the Title VII claim and 
$150,000 in damages under the state tort claim.  Had the jury not known 
about the cap, it might have allocated all of its damages to the sexual 
harassment claim, or at least might have divided the damages 50/50 
between the claims.  Knowledge of the cap allowed the jury to provide a 
larger overall damages award for the plaintiff’s federal and state claims.  
Thus, disclosure of the caps may make a rationally acting jury divide its 
award in a different manner than it otherwise might have done; however, 
the total damage award would not differ from what would have been 
awarded had there been no caps at all.  If juries were able to evade the 
Congressional caps, average total damage awards would be presumably 
be higher. 
Might the jurors act not just to evade the restrictions of the caps, 
but in a way that specifically expresses a reaction to being restricted in 
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their decision-making?  The psychological theory of reactance posits that 
when individuals feel that their behavior options have been limited, they 
react by becoming psychologically aroused.134  Possible effects of this 
stimulus include increased attraction to the forbidden option.  Under this 
theory, juries might not merely reallocate damages into another category 
in order to evade the restriction on their behavior; the restriction might 
even propel them to find a high monetary award more appealing than 
they would have without knowledge of a cap.135  Reactance effects 
would, then, exert upward pressure on overall damages awards.   
In a process similar to reactance, jurors might experience reactive 
devaluation based on revelation of the caps by the judge or attorneys.  
Reactive devaluation describes the phenomenon in which individuals 
assess the appeal of a choice based on the identity of the entity proposing 
the choice.  If an individual perceives a choice as stemming from an 
adversary, the choice is less appealing than the same choice would be 
coming from an ally.136  For example, in the 1980’s, students who heard 
the same proposal about nuclear disarmament rated it more favorably 
when the source was said to be the United States than when the source 
was said to be the Soviet Union.137 
In the case of caps, if the jury perceives the court and/or 
Congress as limiting its power—and thus as an opposing party to it—the 
jury may reactively devalue a damage cap so that it no longer seems 
adequate to compensate a plaintiff fully for the harm suffered.  That is, 
the jury may perceive that if the court and/or Congress believes that a 
cap figure is sufficient to compensate the plaintiff, then it certainly 
cannot be adequate to compensate the plaintiff.  Similar to the process of 
reactance, the jury may then not only award the maximum that the cap 
permits, but may be spurred on to award more money for any other 
available claim.  In absence of disclosure of the caps, jurors are unlikely 
to feel themselves in opposition to the plaintiff once they have decided 
on the defendant’s liability, making it far less likely that the figure 
proposed by a plaintiff will produce reactive devaluation. 
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There is currently no empirical data that supports a reactance or 
reactive devaluation effect in jury damage awards.  A study by Greene et 
al. found that compensatory damage awards made by mock jurors who 
were told of a cap on punitive damages but were able to award uncapped 
compensatory damages did not differ significantly from compensatory 
damage awards made by mock jurors who were able to award unlimited 
punitive and compensatory damages.138  An earlier study by Jennifer 
Robbennolt and Christina Studebaker yielded similar results.139  
However, the Greene study did note that jurors inflated their 
compensatory awards when they were not allowed to give any punitive 
damages at all.140  
Although research findings do not support a finding of reactance 
or reactive devaluation by juries in response to damage caps, it is not 
clear that jurors would never have such a reaction to any legislative cap 
in any legal context.  Several important differences between the studies 
that have been performed to date and the § 1981a context include, for 
example, the § 1981a limit on both punitive and compensatory damages, 
so that in essence the caps limit all non-equitable141 recovery under 
federal civil rights law.  Additionally, there has not yet been a study that 
has tested for reactance or reactive devaluation effects in a group “jury” 
setting rather than among individual mock jurors.142  Without such 
research, we cannot yet say what the likely potential behavioral 
responses to the caps would be.   
   
E. Availability 
 
Informing juries of a cap on damages may also produce an 
availability effect.  The damage cap amount will be more salient, or 
available to the jury, than any other potential damage award.  
Availability is a decision-making heuristic in which decision-makers 
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assess the likelihood of an event by how easily a similar event can be 
brought to mind.143  For example, research has shown that individuals 
believe it is more likely that one would be killed by a shark attack than 
by falling airplane parts.144  Certainly, people have heard more about 
shark attacks than they have about deaths due to falling airplane parts.  In 
truth, however, the odds of death from a shark attack are far lower than 
the odds of death from falling airplane parts.145  Theorists have explained 
this result by noting that examples of shark attacks are far more mentally 
available to the average person than examples of people being hit by 
falling pieces of an airplane.146 
In making their determination of damages, jurors could more 
easily bring the cap amount to mind than other amounts of damage 
awards.  Of course, if the jury would have found damages in an amount 
over the cap without knowledge of the cap, then availability will not 
affect the ultimate outcome. But if a jury would have awarded fewer 
damages, the availability of the cap number may prompt jurors to arrive 
at a higher damages figure.  In essence, availability suggests that jurors, 
trying to think up a damages award, will be asking themselves, “What 
does a damage award look like?” and will answer, “It looks like [the 
figure provided by the court as a cap].”  Any availability effect of the cap 
may also depend on what other damage award numbers are present in 
jurors’ minds.  For example, jurors may know of damage awards in other 
cases,147 or may be aware of both the plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
suggestions of appropriate damage awards.    
 
F.  Satisficing 
 
Knowledge of damage caps may affect not just the bottom line 
but also the “quality” of the jury’s damage decision.  Although empirical 
work has indicated that juries do not make decisions according to 
expected utility theory, the justice system is premised on an assumption 
that juries do make an effort to reach good decisions.  However, 
knowledge of a cap may encourage the use of certain heuristics, or 
“shortcuts” to decision-making, that psychologists and other researchers 
have identified as being used by individual decision-makers in real-
world decision-making.   
For instance, the satisficing heuristic describes a decision-making 
                                                 
143 PLOUS, supra note 97, at 121. 
144 Id. 
145 Id.   
146 Id. 
147 Of course, these may likely be large verdicts that have received publicity. 
 DAMAGE CAPS 28 
process in which a decision-maker sets a minimum value that attributes 
of any alternative must meet.148  The decision-maker considers 
alternatives one by one, in whatever order they happen to be presented.  
The first alternative in which each attribute meets the decision-maker’s 
minimum is selected.  Regardless of how many additional alternatives 
remain to be examined, the decision-maker then stops and does not 
examine any other alternatives.149  
In juror deliberations, a damage cap could encourage a jury to 
choose a satisficing heuristic.  The range of damage awards is far 
narrower with a cap; jurors might perceive the cap as the criteria that 
their award must meet.  Thus, as soon as one juror proposed a damages 
award that fell under the cap, jurors would accept that number without 
considering other alternatives.  For example, a juror might propose 
$250,000 in damages; in light of the cap, other jurors would agree to the 
proposal to save time and effort, even though, without knowledge of a 
cap, jurors might have weighed a number of options and arrived at a 
different decision.  However, there has not been any empirical research 
to date that examines whether juries may use a satisficing process in their 
deliberations.  
 
G.  Overall Effects of Disclosure Versus Non-Disclosure 
 
Psychological research, then, makes clear that the juries’ 
decision-making processes, as well as ultimate awards, will likely differ 
if juries are informed of the damage caps.  Both theoretical work and 
empirical research seem to indicate that disclosure of the caps would 
tend to raise average awards in low-severity injury cases, but would tend 
to lower average awards in high-severity injury cases.  However, given 
the complexities involved in assessing severity levels in individual, 
unique cases,150 it is still largely unclear whether the disclosure of the 
caps would pressure the bulk of awards upward or downward.  
Nonetheless, it is clear that non-disclosure does act as a buffer, 
preventing the caps from affecting the jury’s damage award decision-
                                                 
148 JOHN W. PAYNE, JAMES R. BETTMAN & ERIC J. JOHNSON, THE ADAPTIVE 
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making process.  Thus, the caps do act to protect the integrity of this 
process.151  Below, however, we explore a graver consequence of non-
disclosure—a threat to the integrity of the jury system as a whole.   
 
III 
THE EFFECTS OF NON-DISCLOSURE ON THE JURY SYSTEM 
  
To date, what little systematic attention that has been paid to the 
non-disclosure of damage caps has focused on the potential effects that 
disclosure versus non-disclosure might have on jury damages 
deliberations and calculations.  Above, we offer a more comprehensive 
examination of these effects, suggesting ways in which several 
psychological principles might exert upward or downward pressure on 
the jurors’ ultimate verdicts as well as alter the quality of the decision-
making process itself.  There has, however, been no attention given to 
the (more pernicious) potential effects of non-disclosure of the caps on 
the judicial process itself.  Non-disclosure has the potential to trigger a 
loss of confidence and trust in the jury system, as well as cause 
inefficiencies in the system stemming from effects on attorney and juror 
behavior.  We discuss these effects below.   
 
A.  The Threat to the Jury as a Procedurally Just System 
 
The jury plays a crucial political role in the United States.  It has 
been argued that average citizens follow the law not because of the threat 
of punishment but because the law is perceived as legitimate.152  Juries 
are an important element of the legitimacy of the legal system.153  
Theorists have also identified another important function of the jury:  the 
socializing function in which the jury both allows regular citizens to 
participate in the legal process and educates citizens about that 
process.154  Thus, juries play a political role both on a macro and a 
micro-level, serving as a crucial element of a legitimate democratic 
government and engaging average citizens in the political system. 
Psychological research has identified the principle of procedural 
justice as an important element of individuals’ perceptions and opinions 
of legal systems and structures.  In the 1970s, a growing dissatisfaction 
with the American legal system helped to spawn research into procedural 
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justice.155  Thibaut and Walker suggested that a focus on procedural 
justice—in essence, on the fairness of process—might offer a solution to 
problems such as widespread non-compliance with court orders, 
especially in the child custody domain.156  The fundamental premise of 
procedural justice literature is that individuals are not solely motivated 
by the objective quality or the subjective fairness of the outcome.  
Rather, the procedural justice literature suggests that the justice process 
itself is vital to individuals’ experiences—people are more satisfied with 
outcomes, view them as more favorable, and are more willing to comply 
voluntarily with third-party decisions, when they perceive the process by 
which the outcomes were achieved as fair.157     
Procedural justice effects have been found in a variety of legal 
contexts, including with juries,158 police,159 mediators,160 and other 
government authorities.161  Theorists have suggested that assessments of 
procedural justice are vital to the acceptance of decisions by legal 
authorities and, indeed, to the continued preservation of society.162  
Procedural justice plays a powerful role in shaping trust in, and 
perceptions of legitimacy of, authorities.  People comply with the law, 
trust the law, and respect the law due in large measure to their 
perceptions that the law is a system of fair procedures.  Trust and 
reliance in the jury system are important to the continued respect for the 
justice system as a whole, and trust and reliance can be affected by the 
perception that the jury system is a fair one.163  Concealing damage caps 
from the jury has the potential to suggest a procedurally unfair system:  
players as diverse as the plaintiff, defendant, attorneys, jurors, and the 
public at large may experience procedural justice effects from a rule that 
prevents jurors from learning of damage caps.     
 
1.  Effects on Parties to the Dispute 
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People take their disputes to the legal system not just to win, but 
to resolve their case through a fair process.  How might the concealment 
of a damage cap164 affect parties’ perceptions that the legal process is 
fair?  Procedural justice literature suggests that the process by which a 
dispute is resolved has a distinct impact on the parties’ satisfaction with 
the resolution, over and above the distributive—that is, typically, the 
monetary—outcome.  As we have discussed in Part II supra, disclosure 
of the cap would likely have some impact on the monetary award made 
by the jury, but it is not clear whether the award would systematically 
rise or fall due to disclosure—meaning that it is not clear whether 
plaintiffs or defendants would typically benefit from disclosure of the 
cap.  But procedural justice literature suggests that all parties, even the 
“winners,” are less satisfied with the outcome when it is arrived at 
through an unfair process.165  Thus, a fair process is a powerful factor in 
determining satisfaction.  For this reason, both plaintiffs and defendants 
may be less satisfied with the jury verdict.   
Although both parties may assess the process less favorably if it 
is not procedurally fair, the paradigmatic case in which a procedural 
justice effect is most likely is the case in which a jury awards the 
plaintiff damages higher than the cap amount.  Consider, for example, a 
case such as Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Products in 
which an $8,600,000 punitive damages award was reduced to $300,000 
pursuant to the § 1981a damage caps.166  From a psychological 
perspective, a number of the heuristics and biases that we discussed in 
Part II, supra, come into play in how plaintiffs would assess this 
monetary result.  First, because plaintiffs hear the larger verdict first 
(even if they already know, as is likely, of the existence of the caps), 
they may frame the lower award as a loss of the difference, rather than as 
a gain of the cap amount.  This means that the cap “takes away” money 
that the jury has awarded them and to which they may feel entitled.  
Similarly, the jury’s verdict acts as an anchor when plaintiffs assess what 
their case is “worth”:  plaintiffs can contrast the cap amount with the 
damages award and are more likely to arrive at an unfavorable 
conclusion about the distributive fairness of their outcome. 
But aside from the perception that the actual damages award is 
unfair, plaintiffs are also likely to be more upset and angry with the legal 
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process when a jury awards them one amount and the judge must enforce 
a law that caps that amount.  Procedurally, this is a very different 
experience than the one that plaintiffs would experience if judges 
informed jurors up front that there was a cap on recovery.  In that case, 
juries would never make such an inflated award in the first place, and 
plaintiffs would not experience any sense of either distributive or 
procedural unfairness stemming from the jury’s actions in light of the 
cap.  Any sense of procedural (or distributive) unfairness would have to 
stem from Congress’s actions in capping the damages, rather than 
from—as in the case of concealment—the legal system that permitted a 
“true” assessment of their damages but only gave them some, possibly 
small,167 percentage of that award.   
 
2. Effects on Attorneys 
 
Lawyers, too, may arrive at the conclusion that the system is not 
procedurally fair—and lawyers’ continued respect for legal authorities 
and institutions is an important component of the functioning of the legal 
system as a whole.  In particular, courts have interpreted Title VII’s non-
disclosure requirement to prevent attorneys as well as the court itself 
from informing juries of the caps.  In jurisdictions that permit attorneys 
to request specific amounts of damages, this has the potential to force 
attorneys to engage in a “courthouse charade” in which they must 
explicitly pretend that the caps do not exist. 
Although § 1981a(c)(2) simply requires that “the court shall not 
inform the jury of the limitations” imposed by the caps, in both Sasaki 
and EMC plaintiff’s counsel, not the court, was accused of violating the 
non-disclosure provision.  Moreover, counsel did not even specifically 
mention the caps; instead, they said that jurors could award “up to 
$50,000” 168 or “a maximum of $300,000.”169  But the courts held that 
the reference to a limit on damages was a violation of the non-disclosure 
cap. 
 The reasonable import of these cases, then, is that plaintiff’s 
counsel cannot mention any limit on damages.  But could, or should, 
counsel limit its request to the amount of the caps?  What if plaintiff’s 
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counsel in Sasaki had instead told the jury, “We are asking you to award 
$50,000 on the harassment claim and $150,000 on the tort claim”?  Such 
a pitch has no reference to any limits imposed on damages.  Jurors might 
wonder why the plaintiff had structured her request that way, but they 
would not have been “inform[ed]” of the cap.  Although not ruling on 
this issue, the Fourth Circuit noted that “[s]pecifically requesting the cap 
amount without explicitly mentioning the cap would violate the spirit (if 
not the letter) of the law.”170 
 If counsel cannot even tailor their damage requests to comply 
with the law, then § 1981a(c)(2) goes beyond merely placing a restriction 
on what courts and counsel may say.  Instead, the law has effectively co-
opted counsel into affirmatively perpetuating the charade that the caps do 
not exist.  In interpreting the cap non-disclosure clause, the courts seem 
to be calling on counsel to perform a kabuki-style theater, where 
plaintiffs’ attorneys ask for some amount of damages in excess of the 
caps while knowing they can get no more than the cap.  This puts 
plaintiffs’ attorneys in a quandary as they approach the task of 
determining their damage demand. 
 Moreover, at least according to the D.C. Circuit, a jury is entitled 
to allocate disproportionate damages to a state or local law claim, and 
thus “evade” the cap, if the state or local law claim has no restriction on 
damages.171  In fact, in Martini the court presumed that the jury intended 
to do this, even though the jury had instead allocated the damages 
roughly equally between the two claims.172  A plaintiff’s attorney may 
conceivably want to discuss this possibility with the jury, in order to 
explain how the jury must structure its award to achieve the desired 
result.  However, since such an explanation would at least imply the 
existence of a cap, under Sasaki and EMC it would be impermissible.  
Without information about the caps, jurors would not be in a position to 
express their preferences about damages in light of the damages 
restrictions.  Thus, as in Martini, the court would be left to reconstruct 
juror preferences after the fact. 
In essence, attorneys are co-opted by statute and case law into 
misleading the jury by suggesting damage amounts that are far in excess 
of what the judgment could ultimately be.173  This means that lawyers 
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are required to engage in deception, which increases their perception that 
they are engaged in an untrustworthy system; this seems likely to lower 
lawyers’ respect for the integrity of the legal process.  Additionally, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys may suffer the same effects that plaintiffs 
themselves experience, in that a procedure that allows for the jury to 
pronounce some “value” of a case but only permits recovery of some 
fraction thereof may seem patently unfair, in a way that would not occur 
if juries knew of the cap at the outset.174  And, of course, attorneys 
whose fees are contingency-based may perceive themselves as suffering 
financial loss when they compare their fee under the jury’s original 
determination with their fee under a cap system. 
 
3.  Effects on Jurors 
 
 Jurors’ perceptions of the fairness of the jury system, too, may 
suffer from non-disclosure of the cap.  Imagine yourself as a juror 
considering a Title VII claim.  After hearing testimony about extensive, 
pervasive, and egregious discrimination by a Fortune 500 company, you 
have determined that the defendant is liable for intentional 
discrimination.  The discrimination reached the highest levels of the 
company, and management showed no interest in redressing or 
preventing discrimination in the future.  After determining that the 
company intentionally violated federal law,175 you and the other jurors 
carefully evaluate the evidence to determine the proper level of damages.  
Based on the pain and suffering caused to the plaintiff, the jury awards 
$500,000 in compensatory damages, and levels a $1 million punitive 
award based on the company’s systemic misconduct.  However, after 
spending hours to arrive at this damages assessment, you learn that the 
court will reduce the $1.5 million award to $300,000 and that, in fact, it 
would have been impossible for the plaintiff to receive more than 
$300,000. 
While caps themselves may frustrate a jury that feels that the 
injury with which it is confronted merits a greater payout, we posit that it 
is much more damaging to the jurors’ confidence in the jury system to 
hide the existence of those caps.  While little attention has been paid to 
this concern, we believe it is a significant side effect of a non-disclosure 
system.  It may be that jurors would never learn about the imposition of 
                                                                                                                       
the amount that they “might have been able to get” were it not for the damage cap itself.    
174 In contrast, some attorneys might feel that, at least for high-end awards, 
revelation of the cap could only lower the jury award. 
175 See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999) (holding that 
punitive damages are only permitted for intentional violations). 
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the cap; however, even if they do not learn about it in the courtroom, 
they could still find out in the courthouse or in the press.176  If jurors 
become aware of the damage cap’s effect on their verdict, their belief in 
the procedural justice of the jury system may be eroded.   
Jurors involved in the process may reach the conclusion that the 
process that they have participated in is not procedurally fair with respect 
to their contribution.  Jury duty is a rare moment in which ordinary 
citizens are bound up with the legal system; research has shown that the 
experience of jury duty typically boosts jurors’ positive attitude toward 
jury service and their confidence in the jury system.177  Concealment of 
the cap has the potential to add a component to jury service that would 
worsen jurors’ attitudes toward jury service and decrease their 
confidence in the system.  
Although the number of citizens who serve as jurors at any one 
time is a small percentage of the whole population, in the aggregate a 
substantial portion of the population will at some point serve on a jury.178  
Additionally, jurors communicate their experience on a jury to others so 
that their experiences, negative or positive, have the potential to create a 
ripple effect in the community.179  While it is true that an even smaller 
percentage of those who actually do serve on a jury will serve on a jury 
that hears a Title VII or other federal employment discrimination case, 
there are nonetheless a class of citizens who will have direct experience 
with the concealed damage cap.180   
Concealing the damage cap could affect involved jurors’ 
assessment of procedural justice in other ways as well.  Researchers have 
suggested that voice is an important antecedent of procedural justice 
                                                 
176 Indeed, several commentators have suggested that jurors will eventually learn of 
the caps.  See, e.g., GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 113, at 178; Robbennolt & 
Studebaker, supra note 105, at 357; Saks et al., supra note 105, at 245. 
177 Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think:  Expectations and Reactions of 
Citizens Who Serve as Jurors, in VERDICT:  ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 285 
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
178 Jurors are typically drawn from a voter registration pool, but current trends are 
to expand the pool by using motor vehicle registration and welfare rolls.  HANS & 
VIDMAR, supra note 153, at 54. 
179 Seidman Diamond, supra note 177, at 283–84. 
180 Given the presence of caps in other settings, of course, exposure to a concealed 
cap is not limited to the federal employment discrimination context.  For example, 
North Carolina law caps punitive damage awards at the greater of three times the 
amount of compensatory damages or $250,000, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-25(c) (2005); the 
statute expressly provides that the cap “shall not be made known to the trier of fact 
through any means, including voir dire, the introduction into evidence, argument, or 
instructions to the jury.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-25(c) (2005). 
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assessments.181  When individuals feel that they have had the opportunity 
to express themselves and to be heard, they are more likely to feel that 
the process is a fair one.182  One could conceive of a damages award as 
an expression by the jury of its views with respect to a defendant’s 
behavior.  If the cap thwarts the jury in expressing itself through its 
damage award, jury members may conclude that the process is not a fair 
one.183  The jury members are likely to feel that their voices have not 
been heard or respected, in a way that is unlikely if they know before 
their deliberations that a cap limits the amount of damages that they may 
award.   
Research has also suggested that the degree of control that 
individuals have in any given decision-making process plays an 
important role in whether they feel that the process is fair.184  In the 
context of the jury, it is not the concealment of the cap that affects the 
jurors’ ultimate control over the damages award, but the cap itself.  
Nonetheless, concealing the cap changes the jury’s expectations of its 
own role, so that while a jury aware of the cap might feel that it had full 
control over the damages award within the confines of the cap, a jury 
that did not know of the cap would feel that it had no control if it 
awarded damages in an amount that was summarily rejected due to the 
imposition of the cap.     
 
4. Systemic Effects 
 
Regardless of the individual experiences of people directly 
involved in a particular case, the structural design of a system in which 
jurors are purposely misled and their views are discarded may have 
important procedural justice effects as well.  Particularly since Title VII 
deals with race and sex discrimination, plaintiffs, jurors, and society at 
large could not be blamed for feeling that the system is “fixed” against 
women and minorities after the cap swoops in from out of nowhere to 
rescue defendants.  In light of public perceptions that the justice system 
is systematically biased against racial and ethnic minorities,185 the cap 
non-disclosure clause is only likely to make a bad situation worse.  
                                                 
181 TYLER ET AL., supra note 162, at 94. 
182 LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 101. 
183 See, e.g., Derek R. Avery & Miguel A. Quiñones, Disentangling the Effects of 
Voice:  The Incremental Roles of Opportunity, Behavior, and Instrumentality in 
Predicting Procedural Fairness, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 81 (2002).  
184 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 155. 
185 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee on Racial and Gender Bias in 
the Justice System, Final Report 304-65 (2003), available at 
 http://www.courts.state.pa.us/Index/supreme/BiasCmte/FinalReport.pdf 
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Above and beyond the cap’s limiting of monetary recovery for the 
victims of race or sex discrimination, the non-disclosure provision 
suggests that the government wants ordinary citizens to be kept in the 
dark about this limitation.  Not only are damage caps a protection for 
employers, but they are meant to be a secret from most of the public.   
More broadly, an understanding on the part of the general public 
that jury damage awards are being made in a vacuum of information 
about caps could suggest not only that the decision-making process in 
Title VII cases is unfair, but that the government does not trust ordinary 
citizens with important information.  This directly undermines the 
legitimacy of the jury system and citizens’ trust in authority. 
 
B. The Potential for Flawed Decision-making 
 
 Proponents of cap non-disclosure argue that knowledge of the 
caps would taint juror calculations about the damages.186  However, juror 
ignorance about the cap also has the potential to distort the jurors’ true 
intentions for appropriate relief.  In cases involving both state and federal 
employment claims, different legal regimes may govern the available 
awards that juries may choose.  If courts are interested in determining 
what jurors feel is appropriate in light of these different regimes, it 
would be easiest simply to explain the different systems and have the 
jurors arrive at the appropriate award.  Disclosure would alleviate the 
need for courts such as Martini187 to reallocate damages in an effort to 
achieve the jury’s intended award.  Instead, juries could work within the 
permitted framework to allocate damages according to their conception 
of justice.188 
 Courts such as the Fourth Circuit in Sasaki189 might object to 
giving the jurors the opportunity to game the system by, for example, 
overallocating damages to the uncapped state law claim.  However, what 
does the concept of “overallocation” mean in this context?  The § 1981a 
                                                 
186 See Kang, supra note 5, at 478–79; see also American College of Trial Lawyers 
Committee on Special Problems in the Administration of Justice, Report on Punitive 
Damages, supra  note 18. 
187 Martini v. Federal Nat. Mortgage Ass’n, 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
188 One district court initially thought the “ideal solution” to the problem of 
awarding punitives against multiple defendants in an Americans with Disabilities Act 
case was to inform jurors about the overall cap and then allow the jury to assess specific 
damages against each defendant within the cap.  Equal Employment Opportunity 
Comm’n v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., No. 92-C-7330, 1993 WL 427454, at *11 
n.12 (N.D. Ill. October 21, 1993).  However, the court retracted this plan after learning 
of the non-disclosure provision.  Id. 
189 Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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damage caps do not preempt the ability of states to allow much greater 
damages for the same underlying injury.190  If jurors unsuspectingly 
allocate damages to the capped federal claim rather than the uncapped 
state or local claim, they have essentially been tricked into letting the 
federal cap dictate the scope of relief.  Hiding the effect of the caps, and 
then failing to reallocate damages to the uncapped claims, is 
disrespectful not only of the jury’s decision but also state law.191  The 
best solution is simply to inform the jury about the relevant damages 
limitations and then let the jurors allocate between claims as they deem 
proper.192 
 
  C.  Inefficiencies of Non-Disclosure 
 
 Requiring jurors to be ignorant of the caps imposes inefficiencies 
on the jurors’ process for calculating damages.  If jurors who are 
unaware of the cap know that they wish to award damages greater than 
the cap, but are unsure about what size their award should be, they may 
waste considerable time on an essentially moot decision.  For example, 
suppose that jurors have found the defendant liable in a Title VII 
harassment case but are uncertain whether to award $500,000 or $1 
million in punitive damages.  Jurors may waste considerable time and 
effort in making this decision, but the outcome will be an award of 
$300,000 regardless.   
 A traditional complaint about jury service is that it has the 
potential to waste citizens’ time:  jury service takes people away from 
their work and other responsibilities and can consist of long periods of 
time spent waiting to be empanelled or questioned by attorneys.193  The 
additional time spent by jurors working out a damages award that, in any 
event, will be struck down to the level of the cap can only exacerbate 
jurors’ perception that the judicial system wastes their time.  This 
inefficiency has the potential effect of frustrating the jury system’s 
overall efficiency by providing additional incentives for citizens to evade 
jury service. 
                                                 
190 Befort, supra note 75, at 440–41. 
191 Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 510 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
192 If the state law claim was not contiguous with the Title VII claim but instead 
covered a different kind of offense, the court could strike down the damages if it felt 
that the jury was impermissibly shifting Title VII damages to the (less serious) state law 
violation.  The Sasaki case might be one such example.  See Sasaki, 92 F.3d at 237 
(stating that the jury “award[ed] a significantly larger amount of damages for the ‘lesser 
included’ state conduct and injury”). 
193 See Seidman Diamond, supra note 177, at 286. 
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 Another potential ill effect of required non-disclosure is that it 
promotes—indeed, mandates—citizen ignorance about the law.  This 
contrasts with the general societal prerequisite that citizens be fully 
aware of and follow the law.194  Although most jurors are most likely 
unaware of the damage caps, should the court exclude jurors who do 
know about the caps from Title VII juries?  It would seem to follow from 
Sasaki that jurors should not be informed of the caps, even by other 
members of the jury.195  This poses a bit of a paradox:  how could the 
court or attorneys discover which jurors had such knowledge and should 
be excluded without themselves revealing in some way that such caps 
exist?  Certainly, any process by which potential jurors are quizzed about 
their knowledge of the law adds inefficiency to the jury system.  And, if 
knowledgeable jurors are thus excluded, the pool of potential Title VII 
jurors becomes tilted towards those jurors who are less informed about 
the law generally.   
In a related vein, jurors who have some knowledge of the law 
may be incorrect in their understandings:  for example, a jury member 
might believe that the cap is much lower or higher than it really is, and 
reveal that misinformation to the rest of the jury.196  This misinformation 
could affect and skew the jury’s decision-making far more than an 
explanation by the judge of the relevant cap, providing further departure 
from the proper measure of damages.  For this reason, too, preventing 
the court from informing juries about the caps is problematic.  In the 
absence of revealing the caps, there is no consistency among juries with 
respect to the information they possess about damage awards.           
We do not suggest here that it is never appropriate to prevent 
some individuals from serving, or to conceal some information from the 
jury.  It is undoubtedly true that juries should be as unbiased as possible, 
and jurors are therefore excluded from service for all manner of valid 
reasons.197  Similarly, a court keeps a host of possible data from the jury:  
past criminal records and unduly prejudicial material, for example.  In 
any of these cases, one might raise the concern that keeping the jurors in 
ignorance has a detrimental effect on procedural justice assessments.  
However, in each case, concerns about procedural justice must be 
weighed against the countervailing justice concerns that would be raised 
by allowing jurors access to the information.  For example, allowing 
                                                 
194 Bryan v. U.S., 524 U.S. 184, 194–96 (1998) (noting the “traditional rule that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse”). 
195 Sasaki, 92 F.3d at 237. 
196 See Seidman Diamond, supra note 177, at 290–91 (quoting Judge William 
Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 119–46 (1990)). 
197 HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 153, at 67. 
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jurors to see particularly grisly photos of a crime scene may taint the 
fairness of the trial a defendant receives; the fairness concerns in 
preventing the jury from seeing the photos outweighs the fairness 
concerns of jurors’ access to information.  Indeed, jurors themselves 
might even agree, ex post, that this information could have prevented 
them from making a fair and accurate, unbiased determination of the 
facts.  Additionally, most of the other information that is kept from juries 
is done so in a fact-finding context.  Here, jurors are asked not to 
determine the facts but to arrive at a damages award—there is no “truth” 
to discover, but rather, a decision to be made by the jury about the worth 
of the case.  There is no compelling countervailing reason for this 
enforced ignorance that outweighs its negative procedural justice effects. 
 
IV 
CAP DISCLOSURE AND THE DEBATE ABOUT JUROR DISCRETION 
 
 The disclosure or non-disclosure of damage caps is but one star 
in the constellation of controversy over juror discretion in awarding 
damages.  The propensity for juries to award staggering sums in punitive 
or compensatory damages has spawned an entire political movement 
under the banner of “tort reform.”198  As jurors level punitive damages 
that reach into the billions,199 legislatures and courts have begun 
developing methods to cabin larger verdicts.  Damage caps are one 
straightforward way for legislatures to rein in jury awards.  And the 
Supreme Court has undertaken scrutiny of punitive damages under the 
Due Process clause.200  Both of these developments—the massive awards 
and the efforts to review or restrain them—have generated heated 
political controversy and a wealth of academic analysis and debate.201 
                                                 
198See, e.g., American Tort Reform Association, Bringing Justice to Judicial 
Hellholes, available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes (discussing courts and 
jurisdictions that can “seemingly pull million or billion dollar verdicts out of a hat”).   
199 See Semra Mesulam, Note, Collective Rewards and Limited Punishment: 
Solving the Punitive Damages Dilemma with Class, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1114, 1124 
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$1 billion). 
200 See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW 
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
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 We do not seek to enter into this maelstrom in our limited 
discussion here.  However, our perspective on cap disclosure does 
dovetail nicely with a growing consensus in the realm of damages 
assessment: namely, the benefits of providing more information and 
direction to juries in making their damages assessments. 
 As courts, practitioners, and academics have noted, jurors 
generally get precious little instruction on how to calculate compensatory 
and punitive damages.202  Instructions on compensatory damages may 
simply be a recitation of the different categories of such damages: pain 
and suffering, inconvenience, emotional stress, impairment of quality of 
life, mental anguish, and other “nonpecuniary” losses.203  And punitive 
damages instructions may simply recite the applicable standard for 
awarding them (e.g., “willful and wanton conduct”), and then note that 
the purpose of punitive damages is to punish.204  Even if an instruction 
also counsels the jury to avoid “passion or prejudice,” such an instruction 
on its own does little to provide structure to the jury’s contemplation. 205  
Commentators fear that the unguided discretion provided to juries allows 
jurors’ biases and judgmental deficiencies to take over the damages 
deliberation process.206   
 There is voluminous debate about the extent to which jury 
damage awards have gone “out of control.”207  However, there is greater 
consensus that compensatory and punitive damages are unpredictable 
and variable—namely, that similar injuries do not receive the same 
compensation.208  Studies into this phenomenon have noted the difficulty 
                                                 
202 See, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417 (noting the “imprecise manner in which 
punitive damages systems are administered”); GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 113, 
at 18 (finding a “significant consensus that [jury instructions about damages] are neither 
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203 See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 113, at 19. 
204 Id.  
205 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418. 
206 See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 113, at 19 (citing Thomas M. 
Melsheimer & Steven H. Stodghill, Due Process and Punitive Damages: Providing 
Meaningful Guidance to the Jury, 47 SMU L. REV. 329 (1994)). 
207 Compare, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (“We 
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Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating 
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208 See, e.g., Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and 
Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–3 (2004); Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, 
Jr., On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damages Awards, 42 J.L. & 
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in translating underlying judgments about compensation and punishment 
into actual dollar awards.  In a study of juror decision-making, Sunstein, 
Kahneman and Schkade surveyed jury-eligible citizens about potential 
damages in a personal injury case.209  They found that there was strong 
agreement across demographic groups about the level of outrage and 
punishment to be directed at different factual scenarios.210  However, 
they also discovered that the jurors had great difficulty mapping these 
shared value judgments onto an unbounded scale of dollars.211  As a 
result, they found “severe unpredictability and highly erratic outcomes” 
when it came to the dollar awards determined by participants.212  The 
study showed that participants were susceptible to influence by available 
anchors, any comparison cases that had been provided, or the limited 
context that had been provided in some cases.213  Jurors were searching 
for some kind of framing device and thus relied too heavily on whatever 
context that the materials provided.214 
 Commentators have begun to coalesce around the notion that 
jurors need more context and structure to their deliberations about 
compensatory and punitive awards.215  Juries need more information, the 
thinking goes, in order to place their awards within a predictable and fair 
societal range.  A variety of processes could be implemented in order to 
provide more context.  More specific jury instructions could provide 
juries with more concrete factors or examples to assess when making 
their determination.216  Caps could also provide context: the cap tells 
jurors that the legislature believes damages should rise no further than 
                                                                                                                       
ECON. 527, 540–45 (1999); David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and 
Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 256, 259 (1989) (arguing that tort awards 
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209 See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive 
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215 See, e.g., Melsheimer & Stodghill, supra note 206, at 330; Sunstein, Kahneman 
& Schkade, supra note 209, at 2078–79; Gibeaut, supra note 202, at 46. 
216 See Gibeaut, supra note 202, at 48–49. 
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the amount of the cap.  A more refined system of context would be a 
framework of damage scaling or scheduling: the jury would be given a 
series of characteristics about the case to evaluate, or a set of examples 
of other cases to compare to their own.217  The jurors would thus be 
asked to place their assessments within a framework of societally-
acceptable damage awards.  These frameworks could be constructed 
along the lines of the federal sentencing guidelines: jurors would find 
certain facts about the case and then correlate those facts to the 
guidelines to determine the damages.218  Providing more context to the 
jury’s findings about pain, outrage, and punishment would enable jurors 
to do their jobs more knowledgably and consistently.  
 Disclosure of the damage caps could thus be part of an overall 
contextual framework for jurors in making compensatory and punitive 
awards.  Taking the caps themselves as a given, disclosure of the caps 
would provide jurors with a context for their decisions.  Ideally, 
Congress would give the caps themselves further context for the jurors to 
contemplate.  For example, did Congress intend the caps as the 
maximum that it believed any jury should award?219  If so, judges could 
instruct jurors that the purpose of these caps is to establish the maximum 
amount of damages that a jury can award; thus, these damages represent 
the most extreme end of the spectrum.  In this way, the court would 
acknowledge the effect of response scales on the jury and self-
consciously attempt to create such a scale for the jury to utilize.  If this 
scale were combined with instructions detailing the factors that should 
go into determinations for compensatory and punitive damages, jurors 
could be far more reasoned and systematic in their damage awards.220 
 It is perhaps more likely, however, that Congress did not intend 
$300,000 as the maximum amount of damages that should reasonably be 
                                                 
217 See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 113, at 181–83; David Baldus, John C. 
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awarded in all cases.221  Instead, Congress might have recognized that a 
perfectly rational jury should, in some cases, award more than the cap, 
but might have feared that actual juries would do so far more often than 
would be proper.222  Thus, the cap would be based on Congress’s 
determination that juror bias in inflating damages required a cap that cut 
off some higher awards that would be justified.  Alternatively, Congress 
might have created the caps not out of fear of juror inflation, but instead 
as part of a political compromise.  Under this reading of the statute, the 
caps do not reflect an attempt by Congress to counteract juror bias, but 
instead reflect a number that was acceptable to members of Congress.223  
Under either of these scenarios, a scale for which $300,000 was the 
“maximum” would not reflect Congressional intent.  Instead, courts 
should inform the jurors of the cap, but also inform jurors of the purpose 
behind the cap.224   
If the cap is a response to juror bias, the court should inform the 
jury that Congress has enacted statutory caps in response to a consistent 
tendency of the jury to overestimate the amount of punitive and non-
economic damages.  A straightforward acknowledgment of this tendency 
could lead jurors to recognize it and be more thoughtful in addressing it.  
If the caps result from a political compromise, the jury could be 
informed that the statutory maximum is not meant as an endpoint on a 
scale.  By informing a jury that they have a damage cap, but that the cap 
is not reflective of any Congressional value judgment about juries’ 
damage awards, it might deflate any scaling effects that the number may 
have.  It could also be that the caps were enacted based primarily on a 
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Consequences:  Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 513, 
532–34 (1992). 
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fear that higher awards would potentially cripple employers 
economically.225  If this fear was the driving force behind the caps, jurors 
should be informed of this policy judgment along with the caps.  
Informed jurors would then be more sensitive to potential economic 
harm and might adjust their verdicts based on this Congressional policy. 
 Of course, the legislative history does not tell us exactly why 
Congress enacted the current caps.  But Congress could make clear for 
the future, either in a statutory statement of policy or even in proposed 
jury instructions, exactly what policy concerns the caps reflect.  Instead 
of presuming that jurors cannot handle the truth, Congress should use the 
caps as an opportunity to direct the jury toward a proper level of 
damages.  Congress might even conclude that because a more informed 
jury is better able to handle its responsibilities, it could eventually loosen 
the cap. 
 Proponents of non-disclosure might object that an attempt to 
provide a tighter framework for compensatory and punitive awards 
might impair the “integrity” of the jury’s damages determination.226  
While the notion of the “integrity” or “purity” of the jury’s verdict is an 
appealing one, it has several flaws.  First, while non-disclosure of the cap 
is meant to respect the integrity of the jury’s determination, the cap itself 
is a direct attack on that integrity.  The cap represents a determination 
that the jury cannot be trusted with unfettered discretion to award 
damages.  As one commentator, a proponent of non-disclosure, noted: 
“Statutory caps reflect legislative conclusions that juries are ill-prepared 
to make the inexact estimations inherent in the assessment of 
noneconomic damages.”227  It is hypocritical to be touting the 
importance of the jury’s unadulterated verdict immediately before that 
verdict is chopped down to a pre-set statutory limit. 
 Second, not all information taints a jury’s verdict.  Obviously, 
jurors need information in order to determine damages, and the relevance 
or propriety of different types of information to that determination is 
often hotly contested.  The damage caps are arguably irrelevant to a 
determination of the proper level of damages, since damages are 
generally determined based on facts related to the case.  However, the 
caps do represent a Congressional determination about the maximum 
                                                 
225 See Luciano, 110 F.3d at 221 (“[T]he purpose of the cap is to deter frivolous 
lawsuits and protect employers from financial ruin as a result of unusually large 
awards.”). 
226 See Kang, supra note 5, at 491; 137 Cong. Rec. S15484 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 
1991) (noting that no “upward or downward” pressure should be exerted on the juror’s 
verdict). 
227 Kang, supra note 5, at 492. 
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level of damages for which any employer is potentially liable.  
Moreover, the caps themselves reflect a Congressional intent to reduce 
potential liability for small companies, and to provide a gradation based 
on the number of employees.  To this extent, the caps are plainly quite 
relevant, as they reflect Congressional policy choices.  Awareness of 
these choices could be useful to the jury in making its damages 
determination. 
 
V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Congress deployed the damage cap non-disclosure provision in 
the 1991 Civil Rights Act with little overt consideration of its 
ramifications.  In their thumbnail analyses of this provision, courts have 
come to widely divergent conclusions about its purpose and effects.  We 
conclude that disclosure of the cap would likely affect juror decision-
making processes: most probably, smaller awards would rise and larger 
awards would fall.  However, to focus solely on these effects ignores the 
larger impact that non-disclosure has on the judicial system itself.  In 
light of research about the importance of procedural justice, we argue 
that concealing the cap has the potential to undermine the integrity and 
legitimacy of the jury system. 
 The best answer to the damage cap disclosure dilemma is to 
provide juries with more complete knowledge of the caps and their 
context.  Namely, rather than expressly preventing courts from 
disclosing the existence of the damage caps, Congress should mandate 
disclosure in the context of fuller instructions about damage 
determinations.  Although jurors are indeed likely to be influenced by 
exposure to the cap, this result stems in part from the dearth of any other 
relevant or guiding information provided to jurors about calculating 
damages.  Disclosure and additional contextual background will lead to 
more rational damage determinations.  And perhaps more importantly, it 
will help to protect and promote perceptions that our justice system is 
legitimate, and fair. 
 
